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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
SAN DIEGO COMMITTEE AGAINST 
REGISTRATION AND THE DRAFT v. 
GOVERNING BOARD OF THE GROSSMONT 
UNION HIGH SCHOOL DISTRICT: PUBLIC 
FORUM ANALYSIS IN THE HIGH SCHOOL 
CONTEXT 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In San Diego Committee Against Registration and the 
Draft (CARD) v. Governing Board of the Grossmont Union 
High School District, l the Ninth Circuit held that an anti-draft 
organization's first amendment right to free speech was violated 
when it was denied the opportunity to place anti-draft adver-
tisements in a school district's high school newspapers.2 The 
court's holding was based on its determination that the high 
school newspapers constituted limited public forums.3 The court 
held, in the alternative, that even if the school newspapers con-
stituted non-public forums, the School Board of Grossmont vio-
lated CARD's first amendment rights because its exclusion of 
CARD's advertisement was unreasonable and constituted view-
point-based discrimination.· The district court denied CARD's 
request for a preliminary injunction against the School Board.1I 
1. 790 F.2d 1471 (9th Cir. 1986) (per Reinhardt, J.; the other panel members were 
Goodwin, J.; Wallace, J. dissenting) [hereinafter San Diego CARD). 
2. Id. at 1478. 
3. Id. at 1476. 
4. Id. at 1478. 
5. Id. at 1472 n.l. The advertisement depicted a ghost·like figure, stating "Don't Let 
The Draft Blow You Away!" The following statement appeared below the figure: 
Know Your Rights! 
Know Your Choices! 
If the draft starts wmorrow, you could be in boot camp 11 
23 
1
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The Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded" 
II. FACTS 
The plaintiff, San Diego Committee Against Registration 
and the Draft,? sought to purchase advertising spaces from five 
student newspapers published by high schools in the Grossmont 
School District.8 The School Board denied the plaintiff access to 
the newspapers on the ground that the advertisements consti-
tuted advocacy of an illegal act.· CARD filed an administrative 
claim with the Board seeking a reversal of the School Board's 
decision.10 This claim was denied.ll CARD then brought a civil 
rights suit 12 in the district court seeking a preliminary injunc-
tion against the Board.13 The plaintiff alleged that the Board vi-
olated CARD's rights under the first and fourteenth amend-
ments by denying CARD access to the advertising spaces while 
granting access to military recruitment advertisers. If The dis-
trict court denied CARD relief, determining that CARD had 
failed to show either probable success on the merits of its claim 
or that it had raised a question that was sufficiently serious to 
Id. 
days later. 
Call or Write: Committee Against Registration and the Draft. 
735·7518. 238-6878 
P.O. Box 15195 
San Diego. CA 92115 
6. Id. at 1481. 
7. Id. at. 1472. CARD is a non-profit organization consisting of student and non-
student members. The organization counsels young men on alternatives to compulsory 
military service. Id. 
8. Id. CARD's request for access to the advertising spaces was ultimately given to 
the Superintendent of the School District to issue a policy guideline. Id. 
9. Id.at 1473. See infra note 23. 
Id. 
10. San Diego CARD. 790 F.2d at 1473. 
11.Id. 
12. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982) states in pertinent part: 
"Every person who, under color of any • • • regulation . • • of 
any State • . . subjects or causes to be subjected, any citizen 
of the United States ••• to the deprivation of any rights. _ . 
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the 
party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other 
proper proceedings for redrell8. 
13. San Diego CARD, 790 F.2d at 1473. 
14.Id. 
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warrant issuance of a preliminary injunction.1G The plaintiff ap-
pealed to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. 
III. BACKGROUND 
The First Amendment of the United States Constitution 
states, "Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom 
of speech .... me The right to free speech and expression has 
been considered one of the primary rights of our democratic so-
ciety - "the touchstone of individual liberty"1'1 - upon which 
nearly all other forms of freedom are conditioned.18 Freedom of 
speech is fundamental to our dynamic society, for the right "was 
fashioned to assure unfettered interchange of ideas for the 
bringing about of political and social changes desired by the peo-
ple,"lI' which is "one of the chief distinctions that sets us apart 
from totalitarian regimes. "to 
However, the first amendment's freedom of speech is not 
absolute.21 Restrictions have been placed on speech, and the 
courts have determined that, in certain situations, an individ-
15. [d. The District Court found that: 1) The student newspapers were limited pub-
lic forums. 2) The military service advertisements that had appeared in the student 
newspapers were non-political and offered vocational opportunities to the students. 3) 
The School District policies permitting publication of political speech by students only 
and restricting newspaper access by non-students to commercial speech were reasonable 
in light of the purpose of school publications. [d. 
16. U.s. Const. amend. I. 
17. See J. NOWAK. a ROTUNDA, J. YOUNG, CONSTlTUTIONAL LAw 857-64 (2nd ed. 
1983) (hereinafter J. NOWAK). for a historical background of freedom of speech. 
18. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319. 327 (1937) (assertion that neither liberty nor 
justice would exist if the first amendment freedom of speech did not apply to the states). 
rev'd on other grounds. Benton v. Maryland. 395 U.s. 784 (1969). 
I!!. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan. 376 U.S. 254. 269 (1964) (quoting Roth v. 
United States. 354 U.s. 476. 484 (1956». See generally Emerson. Toward a General 
Theory of the First Amendment. 72 YALE LJ. 877 (1963). 
20. Terminiello v. Chicago. 337 U.S. 1. 4 (1949) (ordinance, as applied to petitioner. 
violated right of free speech). 
21. Dennis v. United States. 341 U.S. 494. 503. 581 (1951) (discussing the history of 
free speech cases). See J. NOWAK. supra note 17 at 857-1027; M NIMMER, NIMMER ON 
FREEDoM OF SPEECH, A TREATISE ON THE FmsT AMENDMENT §§ 2.01-4.11 (1984); Whitney 
v. California. 274 U.S. 357 (1927) "[T)he freedom of speech which is secured by the 
Constitution does not confer an absolute right to speak. without responsibility. whatever 
one may choose. or an unrestricted and unbridled license giving immunity for every pos-
sible use of language •... " Whitney. 274 U.S. at 371 (Criminal Syndicalism Act held 
not to be a restraint on the right of free speech). See generally J. Barron. C. Dienes, 
HANDBOOK OF FREE SPEECH AND FREE PREss (1979) (hereinafter HANDBOOK). 
3
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ual's right to free speech must be tempered by other interests of 
society.22 Thus, the courts have developed restrictions on speech 
in areas such as advocacy of unlawful conduct,23 speech deemed 
to be "fighting words,"24 and obscene,211 commercial,2s and 
libelous speech.27 Even when speech does not fit into one of 
these categories, it can be regulated, provided the regulation is 
content-neutral. These are the so-called time, place, and manner 
regulations.211 Two opposing views of freedom of speech emerged 
during the development of the time, place, and manner regula-
tions. The broad "liberal" view of freedom of speech was elo-
quently expressed by Justice Roberts in Hague v. Committee for 
Industrial Organizations:28 
Wherever the title of streets and parks may rest. 
they have immemorially been held in trust for the 
22. See Whitney, 274 U.S. at 371. The Court stated in Whitney: "[A) state in the 
exercise of its police power may punish those who abuse this freedom by utterances in-
imical to the public welfare, tending to incite crime, disturb the public peace, or endan-
ger the foundations of organized government and threaten its overthrow by unlawful 
means .••• " ld. (citing Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652,666-68 (1925». 
23. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969). "[A state may) forbid or pro-
scribe advocacy of the use of force or of law violation [when) such advocacy is directed to 
inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such 
action." ld. at 447. 
24. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942) (developed the "fighting 
words" doctrine and upheld a statute construed to ban "face-to-face words plainly likely 
to cause a breach of peace by the addressee"). ld. at 573-74. For refinements of the 
doctrine see Lewis v. City of New Orleans, 415 U.S. 130 (1974) (words conveying or in-
tending to convey disgrace are not fighting words); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 
(1971) (fighting words doctrine can only be applied to face-to-face encounters); Termi-
niello, 337 U.S. 1 (1949) (fighting words must present a clear and present danger before 
government can intervene). See generally HANDBOOK, supra note 21 at 63-76; Rutzick, 
Offensive Language and The Evolution of First Amendment Protection, 9 HARv. C.R. -
C. L. L. REV. 1 (1974). 
25. See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957) (obscenity is not protected by 
the Constitution). See generally J. NOWAK, supra note 17 at 1011 (Material will be con-
sidered obscene if it "(a) appeals to a purient interest in sex, (b) has no serious literary, 
artistic, political, or scientific merit, and (c) is on the whole offensive to the average 
person under contemporary community standards"). J. NOWAK, supra note 17 at 1011_ 
See generally HANDBOOK, supra note 21 at 607-69. 
26. See Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942) for the origin of commercial 
speech analysis. See generally HANDBOOK, supra note 21 at 155-BO. 
27. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974) (states may determine what 
standard should be imposed in defamation actions involving private plaintiffs, but negli-
gence is minimum requirement); New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (rec-
ognizing a conditional privilege for libelous statements made by the press media with 
respect to an elected public official). 
28. See generally HANDBOOK, supra note 21 at 93-114. 
29. 307 U.S. 496 (1939). 
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use of the public and, time out of mind, have 
been used for purposes of assembly, communicat-
ing thoughts between citizens, and discussing 
public questions. Such use of the streets and pub-
lic places has, from ancient times, been a part of 
the privileges, immunities, rights, and liberties of 
citizens. The privilege of a citizen of the United 
States to use the streets and parks for communi-
cation of views on national questions may be reg-
ulated in the interest of all; it is not absolute, but 
relative, and must be exercised in subordination 
to the general comfort and convenience, and in 
consonance with peace and good order; but it 
must not, in the guise of regulation, be abridged 
or denir1d.3D 
27 
The more narrow restrictive view was set forth by Justice 
Holmes in Davis v. Massachusetts:sl 
For the legislature absolutely or conditionally to 
forbid public speaking in a highway or public 
park is no more an infringement of the rights of a 
member of the public than for the owner of a pri-
vate house to forbid it in his house. When no pro-
prietary right interferes, the legislature may end 
the right of the public to enter upon the public 
place by putting an end to the dedication to pub-
lic uses. So it may take the less step of limiting 
the public use to certain purposes.3lI 
To strike a balance between the two opposing views, the 
courts have developed the public forum analysis. ss This analysis 
centers on the fact that speakers may possess certain rights ena-
bling thein access to a particular forum to exercise their right to 
free speech. With the public forum analysis, the courts have at-
tempted to define those rights and provide guidance in deter-
mining when time, Dlace, and manner restrictions may be 
imposed. 
30. 1d. at 515·16. 
31. 167 U.S. 43 (1897). 
32. 1d. at 47. 
33. See Cass, First .-lmendment Access to Government Facilities, 65 VA. 1.. REv. 
1287 (1979) for a history of public forum analysis; See also Stone, Fora Americana: 
Speech in Public Places, 1974 SUP. CT. REv. 233. 
5
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Two recent Supreme Court cases34 attempted to extensively 
catalogue the analysis of earlier decisions.3& In Perry Education 
Association v. Perry Local Educators' Association,M the Court 
observed that the existence of a right of access to public prop-
erty and the standard by which limitations upon such a right are 
evaluated will differ, depending on the character of the property 
at issue.37 In its analysis, the Court differentiated between three 
types of forums to which the public's right of access varies, as 
well as the restrictions the state may impose. 
A. PUBLIC FORUMS 
Public forums encompass property which has historically 
been held open for public use and devoted to assembly and de-
bate. M The Perry Court noted that streets and parks are tradi-
tional public forums. 311 However, the courts have not enumerated 
any specific principles to determine what other forms of public 
property could be established as public forums.4o As a result, ac-
34. Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37 (1983) (the use 
of public forum analysis to determine that teachers' mailboxes were non· public forums); 
Cornelius v. NAACP, 105 S.Ct. 3439 (1985) (the use of public forum analysis to deter-
mine charity drive aimed at federal employees to be a non-public forum). 
35. See Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972) (invalidating an ordi-
nance which prohibited picketing on a public way adjacent. to a school while the school 
was in session; the ordinance was found to regulate speech based on its content); Ad-
derley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966) (student demonstration at. a county jail; conviction 
of statutory crime of trespass upheld); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965) (student 
demonstration in opposition to racial segregation conducted near courthouse; convictions 
for breach of peace, obstruction of public passages and picketing all reversed). 
36. 460 U.S. 37 (1983). 
37. Id. at 44. The issue before the Court was whether the first. amendment was vio-
lated when a teachers' exclusive bargaining representative was granted access to the Dis-
trict's interschool mail system, while such access was denied to a rival union. Id. at. 39. 
The Court held that. the mail system was a non-public forum because it found that the 
mail system was not. open for use by the general public although the school had granted 
civic and church organizations periodic access. Id. at 46-47. The Court further held that 
the School Board's regulation denying the rival union access was reasonable.ld. at 50-54. 
The Court determined that the regulation was consistent with the School Board's legiti-
mate interest in preserving the mail system's primary function of transmitting school-
related messages among teachers. Id. at 50·51. By enabling the union to effectively per-
form its obligations and prevent interunion conflicts in the schools, the mail system was 
preserved for its intended purpose.ld. 
38. Id. at 45. 
39. Id. (quoting Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939» (recognizing the right of 
access to a public forum predicated upon established common law notions of adverse 
possession and public trust). 
40. See Note, Public Forum Analysis After Perry Education AssociationlJ. Perry 
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cess to a wide variety of public places has been the subject of 
litigation.41 
United States v. Graceu explained that whether the prop-
erty in question is generally open to the public is a factor to be 
considered in forum analysis.u However, public property does 
not become a public forum simply because the members of the 
public are permitted to come and go at will. 44 
Justice Brennan's dissent in Lehman v. City of Shaker 
H eightsU recapitulates the standards relevant in determining 
when public places will be considered public forums. According 
to Justice Brennan, the Court must balance the interests of the 
government with the interests of the speaker and his audience. 
Accordingly, the Court must examine the primary use of the 
public property and the extent to which that use will be dis-
rupted if access for free expression is granted.·
' 
Once a public place is deemed a public forum, the general 
public does not possess an unfettered constitutional right to use 
the facility as it pleases.47 The restrictions the state may impose 
upon communicative activity include time, place, and manner 
Local Educators' &sociation • A Conceptual Approach to Clainu of First Amendment 
Access to Publicly Owned Property, LIV FORDHAM 1.. REv. 545 (1986). 
41. See United Stat,es Postal Serv. v. Council of Greenburg, 453 U.s. 114 (1981) 
(Jetterbox a non.public forum); Fernandez v. Limmer, 663 F.2d 619 (5th Cir. 1981) (air-
port a public forum), cert. dismissed, 458 U.s. 1124 (1982); Albany Welfare Righta Org. 
v. Wyman, 493 F.2d 1319 (2d Cir. 1974) (welfare office waiting room a public forum), 
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 838 (1974); Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.s. 298 (1974) 
(advertising space on city rapid transit cars a non-public forum); Adderley v. Florida, 
385 U.S. 39 (1966) (jail a non-public forum). 
42. 461 U.S. 171 (1983) (public sidewalks forming the perimeter of the Supreme 
Court grounds are public forums). 
43. Id. at 171. 
44.Id. 
45. 418 U.s. 298 (1974) (advertising space on city rapid transit cars not a public 
forum). 
46. Id. at 312. 
47. Cornelius v. NAACP, 105 S.Ct. 3439, 3448 (1985). Justice O'Connor stated: 
Id. at 3448. 
Even protected speech is not equally permissible in all places 
and at all times. Nothing in the Constitution requires the 
Government freely to grant access to all who wish to exercise 
their right to free speech on every type of government prop-
erty without regard to the nature of the property or to the 
disruption that might be caused by the speakers activities. 
7
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regulations which are content-neutral;u However. such regula-
tions must serve a significant government interest!" In addition. 
if the state imposes a restriction on the communicative activity. 
the state must allow the speaker access to other methods of 
communication.5O Finally. if the state seeks to exclude speech in 
a public forum. based on its content. the state must show that a 
compelling government interest requires such exclusion.lil 
B. LIMITED PUBLIC FORUMS 
Limited public forums. also known as forums by designa-
tion. include public property which the government has opened 
for the purpose of limited or certain expressive activity.li2 A lim-
ited public forum may be established for use by certain groups 
for discussion of any topic. liS or open to the entire public for the 
discussion of particular topics.64 Once a limited public forum is 
created. the right of access encompasses only those groups or 
topics of similar character.1i1i 
Cornelius v. NAACPM developed what is known as the 
"government intent testn to determine whether the government 
has intended to open a non-traditional forum for communicative 
activity.1i'7 According to Cornelius. the courts must look to the 
policy and practice of the government along with the nature of 
48. Perry EdUc. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983). See 
generally HANDBOOK. supra note 21 at 93·114. 
49. Perry, 460 U.S. at 45. 
SO.Id. 
51.Id. 
52.Id. 
53. Id. at 46 n.7 (citing Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981)). 
54. Perry, 460 U.S. at 46 n.7 (citing City of Madison v. Wisconsin, 429 U.S. 167 
(1976». 
55. Perry, 460 U.S. at 48. In Perry, the Court noted: 
[w)hile the school mail facilities thus might be a forum gener· 
ally open for use by the Girl Scouts, the local boys' club, and 
other organizations that engage in activities of interest and 
educational relevance to students, they would not as a conse· 
quence be open to an organization such as [the rival union), 
which is concerned with the terms and conditions of teachers 
employment." 
Id. See also Greer v. Spack, 424 U.S. 828, 838 n.10 (1976) (military reservation could 
exclude political speeches while permitting lectures concerning drug abuse). 
56. 105 S.Ct. 3439 (1985). 
57. Id. at 3449. 
8
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the property and its compatibility with expresssive activity." 
Thus, a limited public forum will not be found if there is a clear 
showing of a contrary intent.a• In addition, when the nature of 
the property is not compatible with expressive activity, courts 
will not designate a public forum. eo 
In Widmar v. Vincent,81 a state university's express policy 
generally afforded registered students access to its facilities. es 
Therefore, the Court concluded that the university's facilites 
were limited public forums generally open for use by student 
groups only.es 
As with public forums, reasonable time, place, and manner 
limitations may be imposed in limited public forums, and a con-
tent based exclusion can be imposed if it serves a compelling 
state interest.M As Justice Marshall stated in Police Department 
of Chicago v. Mosley:e& 
[G]overnment may not grant the use of a forum 
58. Id. The issue in ComeliU8, was whether the first amendment was violated when 
the federal government excluded legal defense and political advocacy organizations from 
participating in the Combined Federal Campaign, a charity drive directed towards fed-
eral employees at their place of business. Id. at 3443. The Court held that the organiza-
tions' first amendment rights had not been violated by the exclusion. Id. at 3455. The 
Court had to determine whether the forum to address was the federal workplace or the 
charity drive. The Court stated that the correct forum was to be defined in temlS of the 
access sought by the speaker and thereby rendered the charity drive as the forum at 
issue. Id. at 3449. However, the Court further explained that it was necessary to examine 
the special nature and function of the workplace when assessing its compatibilty with 
expressive activity. I d. 
The Court found the charity drive to be a non-public forum after applying the two 
prong intent test.ld. at 3451. First, the Court found that neither the government's prac-
tice nor policy evinced an intent to open the charity drive as a public forum, for the 
government consistently limited participation to voluntalJ agencies which it deemed ap-
propriate. Id. at 3450-51. In addition, the government developed extensive admission 
criteria to limit access to the forum. Id. at 3451. Second, the Court examined the nature 
of the federal workplace and found that it existed to accomplish the employers' businesa. 
Id. The Court concluded that the government had the right to exercise control over ac-
cess to the federal workplace to avoid constant interruptions of the employees' perform-
ances. Id. 
59. Id. at 3450. 
SO.ld. 
6t. 454 U.S. 263 (1981). 
62. Id. at 265. 
63. Id. at 267. 
64. Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 4SO U.s. 37, 46 (1983). 
65. 408 U.S. 92 (1972) (anti-picketing ordinance held unconstitutional on the 
grounds that it discriminated among pickets based on the content of their expression). 
9
Mullane: Constitutional Law
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1987
32 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 17:23 
to people whose views it finds acceptable, but 
deny use to those wishing to express less favored 
or more controversial views .•.. [G]overnment 
must afford all points of view an equal opportu-
nity to be heard. Once a forum is opened up to 
. . . speaking by some groups, government may 
not prohibit others from ... speaking on the ba-
sis of what they intend to say.&e 
C. NON PUBLIC FORUMS 
Non-public forums constitute public properties which are 
not traditional public forums or forums designated for commu-
nication.87 In International Society for Krishna Consciousness 
v. New Jersey Sports and Exposition,S! the court held that a 
race track and stadium did not constitute a public forum.1III The 
court noted that it would not be appropriate to declare a certain 
location a public forum when the full' exercise of first amend-
ment rights would be inconsistent with the primary use of the 
property.10 Mter examining numerous Supreme Court deci-
sions,ll the court stated that the race track did not fit into any 
of the accepted descriptions of a public forum.12 
In Greer v. Spock," the Supreme Court found a military 
reservation could constitutionally exclude political speeches and 
66. Id. at 96. 
67. Perry, 460 U.S. at 46. 
68. 691 F.2d 155 (3d. Cir. 1982). 
69. Id. at 158. 
70. Id. at 160 (quoting Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Service Comm'n, 447 U.S. 
530, 540 (1980». . 
71. Int'Z Society, 691 F.2d at 160 (to determine whether property owned or con-
trolled by the state is a public forum, the courts must first examine how the forum is 
used); Hetl'ron v. Iskon, Inc., 452 U.S. 640 (1981) (state fair a limited public forum be-
cause it exists to provide means of exhibition to large numbers of people); Jones v. North 
Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union, 433 U.S. 119 (1977) (prison is not a public forum for its 
inmates because the exercise of such free speech rights would conflict with the operations 
of the prison); Southeastern Promotions v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, (1975) (municipal thea-
tres and auditoriums are designed for and dedicated to expressive activities). 
72. Int'l Society, 691 F.2d at 161. The court reasoned that the stadium complex was 
not analogous to traditional public forums such as street and parks, nor was the comple t 
designed and created for expressive activity. Moreover, the court stated that the stadium 
complex was a commercial venture created by the state designed to generate revenue. 
Id. 
73. 424 U.S. 828 (1976). 
10
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distribution of leaflets in two areas open to the general public.7• 
The Court stated that the basic function of a military reserva-
tion is to train soldiers, not to provide a public forum.7& As 
stated by Justice Stewart, "[t]he notion that federal military 
reservations, like municipal streets or parks, have traditionally 
served as a place for free public assembly and communication of 
thoughts by private citizens is thus historically and constitution-
ally false."7s Accordingly, the nature and purpose of the military 
reservation was not found to be compatible with the expressive 
activity sought to be communicated.77 
In non-public forums, states may impose the same reasona-
ble time, place, and manner restrictions that are permitted in 
the traditional and limited public forums.78 Moreover, access to 
a non-public forum may be restricted to preserve the forum for 
its intended purpose if the regulation is reasonable and not 
based on opposition to the speaker's view.78 The reasonableness 
of a regulation must be assessed in light of the purpose of the 
forum and all the surrounding circumstances,80 thereby reserv-
ing the forum for its intended purpose.'1 To preserve the non-
public forum for activities compatible with its intended purpose, 
the state may make distinctions regarding access on the basis of 
74. ld. at 838. 
75. ld. at 834. 
76. ld. at 838. 
77. ld. at 838 n.10. The court noted that even though civilian lectures on drug abuse 
and religious services had taken place on the base, this fact did not of itself convert the 
base into a public forum to allow political candidates the right to campaign on the b~_ 
ld. 
78. Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Loca1 Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 46 (1983) (citing 
United States Postal Serv. v. Council of Greenburg, 453 U.S. 114, 131 n.7 (1981)). 
79. Perry, 460 U.S. at 46. 
SO. Cornelius v. NAACP, 105 S.Ct. 3439, 3453 (1985). 
81. Perry 460 U.S. at 46. "(T)he State, no less than a private owner of property, has 
power to preserve the property under its control for the use to which it is lawfully dedi-
cated." ld. (quoting United Stotell POIItol Serv., 453 U.s. at 129-30, quoting Greer v. 
Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 836 (1976), quoting Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 47 (1966». See 
also Cornelius v. NAACP, 105 S.Ct. 3439 (1985). Legal defense fund organizations 
brought suit alleging the federal government violated their first amendment rights when 
it excluded them from participating in the Combined Federal Campaign, a charity drive 
aimed at federal employees. CorneliUII, 105 S.Ct. at 3443. The Supreme Court held the 
federal government had not violated the legal defense funds first amendment rights. Cor-
nelius, 105 S.Ct. at 3455: The Court held that the charity drive was a non-public forum, 
therefore, the government's desire to avoid political favortism was a valid justification to 
exclude the group, as was the desire to minimize disruption of the work place. CorneliUII, 
105 S. Ct. at 3451. 
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subject matter and speaker identity.82 However, when making 
such distinctions, reasonable grounds for denial of access will 
not sanctify a regulation that is in reality a facade for viewpoint-
based discrimination.83 
D. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE RIGHT TO FREE SPEECH IN THE 
CONTEXT OF HIGH SCHOOLS 
When dealing with first amendment rights and their limita-
tions in schools, courts have developed the principle that first 
amendment rights must be considered in light of the special cir-
cumstances of the school environment.84 In Tinker v. Des 
Moines School District,8G three high school students had been 
suspended from school for wearing black arm bands in protest of 
the Vietnam war.86 In holding that the students' conduct was 
protected by the free speech clause of the first amendment,S? 
and the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment,88 the 
United States Supreme Court found that first amendment rights 
are available to students.811 As stated by the Court, "[t]he vigi-
lant protection of constitutional freedoms is nowhere more vital 
than in the community of American schools."" The Court noted 
that the judiciary has consistently affirmed the position that 
school officials must be given full authority to prescribe and con-
trol conduct in the school,1I1 yet this authority must not abridge 
fundamental constitutional safeguards afforded to the stu-
dents.92 Tinker set forth a test to determine whether a restric-
tion on an expressive activity is justified.1I3 A restriction is justi-
fied when the activity "materially disrupts classwork or involves 
substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others."94 Thus, 
the Court found that because the students' protest was not dis-
82. Perry. 460 U.S. at 49. 
83. Cornelius. 105 S.CL at 3454. 
84. Tinker v. Des Moines School DisL. 393 U.S. 503. 506 (1969). 
85. 393 U.S. 503 (1969). 
86. rd. at 504. 
87. rd. at 50S-OS. 
88. rd. 
89. rd. at 506. 
90. rd. at 512 (quoting Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents. 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967). quot-
ing Shelton v. Tucker. 364 U.S. 479, 487 (1960». 
91. Tinker. 393 U.S. at 507. 
92. rd. 
93. rd. at 513. 
94. [d. 
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ruptive of the school environment or of other students' rights, ell 
the School Board violated the students' right to free speech." 
When embarking on a forum analysis of access claims to 
schools and their environs, the court must identify and examine 
the nature of the property at issuee7 and its compatibility with 
expressive activity." Additionally, the court must examine the 
school board's policies and practices to determine the type of 
forum the board intended to create." Therefore, it is important 
to note that it may not be possible to apply a ~ingle rule across 
the board as to the type of forum a school and its environs will 
be classified. Access claims vary according to the particular fo-
rum sought to be utilized, and the policies and practices of the 
school boards differ depending on the forum. loo 
In Grayned v. City of Rockford,lol the Court held that 
members of the general public may be afforced access to the 
public sidewalks surrounding a high school campus for expres-
sive activity, provided that activity falls within the guidelines set 
by Tinker.los Justice Marshall, speaking for the Court, espoused 
95. ld. at 514. ''The record does not demonstrate any facts which might have rea-
sonably led school authorities to forecast substantial disruption of or material interfer-
ence with school activities, and no disturbances or disorders on the schoolpremises in 
fact occurred." ld. 
ld. 
96.ld. 
97. Cornelius v. NAACP, lOS S.Ct. 3139, 3446 (1985). 
98. ld. at 3449. 
99. ld. As stated by the Court in CorneliU8: 
The government does not create a public forum by inaction or 
by permitting limited discourse. but only by intentionally 
opening a non-traditional forum for public discourse. Accord-
ingly, the Court has looked to the policy and practice of the 
government to ascertain whether it intended to designate a 
place not traditionally open to assembly and debate as a pub-
lic forum. 
100. See Perry EdUc. Asa'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.s. 37 (1983). 
101. 408 U.s. 104 (1972). 
102. Grayned, 408 U.s. at 121. In Grayned, students, family members and friends, 
totaling approximately two hundred people, took part in a demonstration which was 
planned after school administrators did not respond to students' complaints. ld. at lOS. 
Grayned had been arrested and convicted for participating in the demonstration in viola-
tion of an anti·picketing ordinance and an anti-noise ordinance. ld. at 106. Grayned 
challenged the constitutionality of the ordinances but did not insist that the ordinances 
had violated constitutionally protected activity. ld. 
The anti· picketing ordinance, which the Court held to violate the Equal Protection 
Clause of the fourteenth amendment, provided that: "A person commits disorderly con-
13
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the broad, liberal view of Justice Roberts in Hague/os stating 
that free expression "must not, in the guise of regulation, be 
abridged or denied."I04 Justice Marshall relied on Tinker in rec-
ognizing the need to apply first amendment rights in accordance 
with the special characteristics of the school environment. lOG He 
re-emphasized that "wide exposure to [the 1 robust exchan&e of 
ideas is an 'important part of the educational process and should 
be nurtured' ".loe Thus, as with Tinker, the Grayned Court 
stated that free expression by students should not be barred 
from the school campUS.107 Noting that the general public does 
not have an absolute right of access to schools or their envi-
rons,l08 the Court applied Tinker and declared that curtailing 
the general public's free speech may be permitted only if such 
expressive activity "materially disrupts classwork or involves 
substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others."lo~ Jus-
tice Marshall explained that a determination must be made as to 
whether the manner of expression is basically incompatible with 
the normal activity of the particular place at a particular time to 
warrant curtailing the public's free speech. 110 The narrow re-
strictive view of Justice Holmes is evidenced in Student Coali-
tion for Peace v. Lower Merion School District.111 In Student 
Coalition, a non-school sponsored student organizationl12 sought 
duct when he knowingly: (i) Pickets or demonstrates on a public way within ISO feet of 
any primary or secondary school building while the school is in session and one-half hour 
before the school is in session and one-half hour after the school session has been con-
cluded, provided that this subsection does not prohibit peaceful picketing of any school 
involved in a labor dispute __ .... ld. at 107. 
The anti-noise ordinance which the Court upheld as constitutional, provided in part: 
"No person, while on public or private grounds adjacent to any building in which a 
school or any class thereof is in session, shall willfully make or assist in the making of 
any noise or diversion which disturbs or tends to disturb the peace or good order of such 
school session or class thereof ...... ld. at 107-08. 
103. 307 U.S. 496 (1939). 
104. Grayned, 408 U.S. at 117 (quoting Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 516 (1939». 
lOS. Grayned, 408 U.S. at 117. 
1(\5. ld. at 117 (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 512 
(1969». 
107. Groyned, 408 U.S. at 117. 
108. ld. at 117-18. 
109. ld. at 118 (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 513 
(1969». 
110. Groyned, 408 U.S. at 116. See Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131 (1966) (silent 
vigil will not interfere with a public library). 
Ill. 776 F.2d 431 (3d Cir. 1985). 
112. ld. at 433. The organization was dedicated to the cause of world peace through 
nuclear disarmament. ld. 
14
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access to the high school's athletic field to stage a Peace Fair.us 
Though the field had been regularly used for non-school commu-
nity events,114 the court determined that the field had not been 
designated as a forum for community events.11II In finding a non-
public forum,118 the court concluded that the School Board's de-
cision to deny the organization access to the field was reasona-
ble.ll7 The court based its conclusion on the School Board's de-
sire "to keep the 'podium of politics off school grounds' "118 and 
to maintain an appearance of neutrality.1JI) The court noted that 
the Board's decision would be upheld as reasonable even if its 
fears of potentially disruptive political controversy proved to be 
unfounded. 120 
IV. THE COURT'S ANALYSIS 
A THE MAJORITY 
1. Newspapers as Limited Public Forums 
The Ninth Circuit began its analysis by discussing whether 
the school newspapers were public, limited, or non-public fo-
rums.1I1 To make this determination, the court focused on the 
intent of the School Board as evidenced by the Board's publica-
tion policies and practices as well as the nature of the newspa-
pers and their compatibility with expressive activity.122 The 
court found that by their very nature, school newspapers are de-
voted entirely to expressive activity, since everything that ap-
pears in the newspaper is speech.123 The court concluded that 
newspapers were the type of property most compatible with ex-
113. Id. 
114. Id. at 433·34. 
115. Id. at 437. 
116. Id. The court in Student Coalition based its decision upon two factors: 1) The 
School Board's policy required that non·school sponsored organizations obtain permis· 
sion to use the field. 2) The athletic field was not created for expressive activity. Id. 
117. Ill. 
118. Id. 
119. Id. CI Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969) (justifiable re-
striction on expressive activity when it "materially disrupts class work or involves sub-
stantial order or invasion of rights of others") Tinker, 393 U.S. at 513. 
120. Student Coalition, 776 F.2d at 437. 
121. San Diego CARD, 790 F.2d at 1476. 
122. See Cornelius v. NAACP, 105 S.Ct. 3439, 3449 (1985). 
123. San Diego CARD, 790 F.2d at 1476. 
15
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pressive activity.124 
The court ultimately found that the Board created a limited 
public forum in the newspapers in two respects, as evidenced by 
the Board's policies and practices.125 First, the Board allowed a 
certain group, the students, access to the newspapers to discuss 
any topic,128 thereby creating a limited public forum similar to 
that in Widmar.12'1 Second, the Board's policy governing the 
newspapers also entitled the general public access to the news-
papers with the only content limits ueing that the advertise-
ments had to offer goods, services, or vocational opportunities to 
the students.128 Therefore, the court reasoned, the Board's in-
tent to create a limited public forum was established.1211 
Having determined that the school newspapers constituted 
a limited public forum to which the right of access encompassed 
only those topics of similar character, the court found that the 
issue narrowed itself to a debate over the particular limitations 
the Board could impose on the topics the nonstudents wished to 
discuss in the newspaper.130 
The court first examined the military ads the Board allowed 
to be published.l3l Agreeing with the district court, the Ninth 
Circuit found that the military ads published in the newspapers 
were vocational or career ads. us But the Ninth Circuit further 
held that the district court erred when it found that the military 
recruitment ads were nonpolitical.l33 In reaching this conclusion, 
the court reasoned that the government's interest in promoting 
124. ld. 
125. ld. 
126. ld. Students were subject to certain conditions which were not relevant to the 
issue before the court. [d. 
127. See supra text accompanying notes 61-63. 
128. San Diego CARD, 790 F.2d at 1476. 
129. [d. See also City of Madison School Dist. v. Wisconsin, 429 U.S. 167 (1976) 
(limited public forum open to the entire public for the discussion of certain topics). 
130. San Diego CARD, 790 F.2d at 1476. The Board contended that its policies per-
mitted nor·students to engage only in non-political commercial speech. [d. at 1476-77. 
The Board also claimed that the military service advertisements were non-political, but 
CARD's advertisements were not. [d. at 1477. The District Court found that the military 
service advertisements (1) offered vocational or career opportunities to students and (2) 
were non-political. [d. 
131. ld. at 1477. 
132. [d. 
133.ld. 
16
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military service is not based on economics, rather, it is essen-
tially political or governmental.134 The court reviewed the his-
tory of military service and found it to be both controversial and 
political in nature,m thereby negating the totally commercial as-
pect of the military ads.13s Thus, the military ads printed in the 
school newspapers presented one side of a political dispute. 137 
Through this analysis, the court found that the Board's actual 
policy permitted nonstudents to engage in speech which is both 
political and commercial, at least in respect to the military ser-
vice topic itself.13s "Having established a limited public forum, 
the Board [could] not, absent a compelling government interest, 
e~dude speech otherwise within the boundaries of the forum."13e 
No such interest was found to exist here.140 Therefore, since 
CARD's advertisements were composed of the same political and 
commercial speech as the permitted military advertisements, the 
Board's exclusion of CARD's advertisements violated CARD's 
first amendment rights. l4l 
2. Newspapers as Non-Public Forums 
In the alternative, the Ninth Circuit held that even if the 
school newspapers were non-public forums, the Board neverthe-
less violated CARD's first amendment right to free speech. 142 
The court held that the Board's conduct denying CARD access 
to publish its ads was unreasonable and constituted viewpoint-
based discrimination.143 
134. ld. 
135. ld. The court noted that opposition to military service has been pres<!nt 
throughout the nation's history. See, e.g. United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965) 
(discussing the history of conscientious objection). The student protests over military 
service in the late 1960's and 1970's also reflected the controversy. See also In re Sum-
mers, 325 U.S. 561 (1945) (attorney could be denied admission to state bar because of his 
opposition to military service). 
136. San Diego CARD, 790 F.2d at 1478. 
137. ld. at 1477. 
138. ld. at 1478 (emphasis in original). 
139.ld. 
140. ld. 
141. ld. See Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37 (1983) 
(once a limited public forum is established, the constitutional right of access extends 
only to other entities of similar character). 
142. San Diego CARD, 790 F.2d at 1478. 
143. ld. 
17
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In a non-public forum, restrictions on speech are upheld if 
they are reasonable and are not an attempt to engage in view-
point discrimination. 144 The court, nevertheless, rejected all 
three of the Board's arguments that its exclusion of CARD's ad-
vertisements was reasonable.1411 
First, the court rejected the Board's contention that the ad-
vertisements' political character was a reasonable basis for ex-
clusion.wl The court stressed that because the published mili-
tary advertisements were not solely non-political, but were in 
fact, of a mixed political and commercial nature,147 the Board 
could not reasonably exclude CARD's advertisements when they 
pertained to the same politically controversial subject matter.UI 
Concerning the Board's second contention, that publication 
of the advertisements would promote non-registration for the 
draft, amounting to an illegal act, the court held that the Board 
could not imply that CARD sought to promote illegal activity 
based on its name alone.u • The court noted that a state could 
prevent an individual's activities which are geared toward incit-
ing or producing imminent lawless action where it is likely that 
illegal conduct will result.1l10 However, since the Board did not 
produce any evidence to substantiate this claim, the court con-
cluded that denying CARD access to the newspapers on the ba-
sis of speculation1ll1 was unreasonable.I112 
144. See supra text accompanying notes 73-83. 
145. San Diego CARD, 790 F.2d at 1480. 
146. rd. at 1479. 
147. rd. 
148. rd. The Board's asserted policy allowed for restricting the publication of ads 
proffered by non-students, to non-political advertisements offering goods, services or 
vocational opportunities to students. rd. at 1476-77. 
149. rd. at 1479. 
150. rd. (citing Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969». The Court in Bran-
denburg reversed the conviction of a Ku Klux Klan leader for violating Ohio's Criminal 
Syndicalism Statute which prohibited the advocation of political reform t.'lrough violence 
and the formation of groups formed to teach criminal syndicalism. Brandenburg, 395 
U.S. at 444-45. The Court held that "[The state may not) forbid or proscribe advocacy of 
the use of force or of law violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or 
producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action." Bran-
denburg, 395 U.s. at 447. 
151. San Diego CARD, 790 F.2d at 1479. The record disclosed the Board derived 
their allegation solely on the basis of CARD's name. rd. See Gay Students v. Bonner, 509 
F.2d 652, 662 (1st Cir. 1974) (speculation that an individual may at sometime engage in 
illegal conduct is insufficient to justify a regulation). 
152. San Diego CARD, 790 F.2d at 1479. "To the contrary, the record indicated that 
18
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The court also rejected the Board's argument that the ad-
vertis~ment exclusion was predicated out of desire to allow the 
students to utilize the newspapers as a forum for their own free 
expression, rather than as a forum for a host of nonstudent 
groups.m The court acknowledged that, practically speaking, 
the Board may impose access limits on the amount of nonstu-
dent materials, but such restrictions may not be imposed arbi-
trarily or unreasonably.la4 The court found that the Board's 
treatment of CARD's advertisement was arbitrary because the 
Board was unable to distinguish how publication of CARD's ad-
vertisements would diminish the students' right of access, while 
the military advertisements would not do so.m Moreover, the 
Board did not present any objective system for limiting or 
choosing ads concerning the same subject matter. 1M Thus, the 
court found that the Board was unable to offer any reasonable 
basis upon which to justify the exclusion. Ja7 
Finally, the court held that the Board had exercised view-
point-based discrimination because it had not provided a valid 
basis for denying CARD access to the same forum as that uti-
lized by the military advertisements. las The Ninth Circuit rea-
soned that the only inference that could be drawn from the 
Board's publication of only pro-military recruitment advertise-
.ments was that the Board was barring CARD's anti-draft ads 
because of their content or message. Jail Since the Supreme Court 
CARD, through its advertisement, sought. to apprise eligible st.udents of legitimate and 
lawful alternatives to the draft, such as the availabilit.y of student deferments." Id. 
153. Id. at 1480. 
154. Id. 
155.1d. 
156. Id. 
157. !d. 
158. Id. at. 1481. 
159. Id. See City of Madison v. Wisconsin, 429 U.s. 167 (1976) (School Board meet-
ing open to the public; held, non-union teacher Iud the right to speak even though the 
subject. pertained to pending collective bargaining negotiations). The Court stated: "To 
permit one side of a debatable public question to have a monopoly in expressing its 
views ••• is the antithesis of constitutional guarantees. .. City of Madison, 429 U.s. at 
175-76. See elso Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.s. 92 (1972) (city ordinance 
prohibiting all picketing within one hundred and fifty feet of school except peaceful 
picketing of any school involved in a labor dispute held to be discriminatory). The Court 
in Mosley stated that "the first amendment means that government has no power to 
re'Jtrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject. matter, or its content." 
Mosley, 408 U.S. at 95. 
19
Mullane: Constitutional Law
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1987
42 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 17:23 
had previously held in Corneliuslso that such viewpc: nt-based 
discrimination is impermissible, even in a non-public forum,161 
this provided the majority with a second ground for finding the 
Board's actions violated the first amendment.lu 
B. DISSENT 
Judge Wallace challenged the majority's conclusion that the 
Board's acceptance of the military ads created a limited public 
forum from which CARD's advertisements could not r? ex-
cluded. us The dissent argued that the majority ignored the 
"teachings" of Cornelius. IN It concluded that the school papers 
constituted a non-public forum and that the restrictions the 
Board sought to impose on CARD's advertisements were reason-
able.l8II However, Judge Wallace believed that a remand was 
necessary in order to determine specifically whether the Board's 
rejection constituted viewpoint-based discrimination. ISS 
Judge Wallace began his analysis by focusing on the issue of 
the identification of the forum itself.ls7 He asserted that the cor-
rect forum at issue was not the newspapers in general, but 
rather, the newspaper advertising spaces, since CARD sought ac-
cess only to the particular advertising spaces.u , 
Applying the Cornelius intent test,ISe the dissent argued 
that the Board's policies and practices did not .'epresent an in-
tention to grant general access to the newspapers' advertising 
spaces.170 Judge Wallace relied on the Board's policy which gave 
the publication staff and advisor discretion to publish paid ad-
vertisements by nonstudents, if they dE'termined that the adver-
tisements would advance the newspapers' "primary purposes 
160. 105 S.Ct 3439 (1985). 
161. Id. at 3554. 
162. San Diego CARD, 790 F.2d at 1481. 
163. Id. at 1483. 
164.ld. 
165. Id. at 1485. 
166. Id. 
167. See Cornelius v. NAACP, lOS S.Ct. 3439, 3449 (1985) (defining forum according 
to access Bought by the speaker). 
168. San Diego CARD, 790 F.2d at 1483. 
169. See supra text accompanying notes 56·60. 
170. San Diego CARD, 790 F.2d at 1483-84. 
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sufficiently to warrant publication."1'11 Judge Wallace reasoned 
that this policy, coupled with the practice of limiting advertise-
ments to those offering goods, services, or vocational opportuni-
ties to students, indicated the Board did not intend to create a 
limited public forum.m 
Applying the second prong of the Cornelius intent test, the 
dissent argued that the purposes of the advertising spaces were 
to teach students journalistic management and to help finance 
the publication of the newspapers, not to create a forum for ex-
pressive activity for nonstudents.l'lS Therefore, the Board's pol-
icy enabling it to exclude CARD's advertisements should be up-
held, in order to avoid disrupting the educational proc:3S.174 
Finally, the dissent rejected the majority's contention that 
"if speech admitted in a forum relates to a 'controversial and 
political issue', the government has created a limited public fo-
rum that encompasses the issue."1'11! Judge Wallace argued that 
such a test is in conflict with the government intent test set out 
in Cornelius.1'18 The dissent asserted that if the majority's test 
were applied to Cornelius, health and welfare services would be 
considered "controversial and political", thereby opening up the 
campaign into a limited public forum from which legal defense 
and political advocacy organizations could not be excluded.177 
"This result was expressly rejected by the Supreme Court in 
Cornelius.1'18 
Having concluded that the school newspapers constituted a 
171. Id. at 1484. 
172. Id. at 1483·84. See also ComelilU, 105 S.Ct. 3439. "(S]elective access, unsup-
ported by evidence of a purposeful designation for public use. does not create a public 
forum." Cornelius, 105 S. Ct. at 3451. 
173. San Diego CARD, 790 F.2d at 1484. (There is no evidence in the record that 
the Board advanced this argument). 
174. Id. Justice Wallace stated: "(O]ur obligation to apply First Amendment rights 
'in light of the special characteristics of the school environment' n, (citing T'.niter v. Des 
Moines School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969», "requires that we aW?;it 'school policies 
that are reasonably designed to :::!jttllt those rights to th~ !::;cds of the school environ· 
ment.' .. (citing Nicholson v. Board of Education, 682 F.2d 858, 863 (9th Cir. 1982». San 
Diego CARD, 790 F.2d at 1484. 
175. San Diego CARD, 790 F.2d at 1484. 
176.ld. 
177. Id. 
178. 105 S.Ct. 3439 (l!l85). 
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non-public forum,179 Judge Wallace applied the Cornelius test to 
determine when restrictions on access to such a forum will be 
upheld.180 Judge Wallace argued that the Board's denial of ac-
cess to the newspapers was reasonable, for it was designed to 
avoid disruption in the school.181 Though the School Board did 
not argue that publication of CARD's advertisement would 
cause disruption in the school, Judge Wallace stated that the 
Board was acting pursuant to a policy which was developed to 
limit disruption.182 
While Judge Wallace agreed that military recruitment ads 
may tender political implications, he chose to follow the stan-
dard of review applicable to restrictions in non-public forums as 
set out in Student Coalition for Peace v. Lower Merion School 
District.18s Under that test, a School Board need only draw a 
reasonable line between political and non-political speech.1M 
The dissent concluded that the military ads were non-political 
and CARD's ads could reasonably be excluded as political.1811 
The dissent objected to the majority's inference that the 
Board's refusal of CARD's advertisements constituted view-
point-based discrimination,188 since it found the military ads to 
be non-political.187 However, Judge Wallace stated that because 
none of the district court's findings explicitly addressed this is-
sue, a specific finding on viewpoint-based discrimination should 
be deteTmined on remand. 1M 
179. San Diego CARD, 790 F.2d at 1484. 
180. Id. at 1483-84. 
181. Id at 1485. 
182. Id. at 1485 n.2. 
183. 776 F.2d 431 (3d Cir. 1985). In Student Coalition the court maintained that 
the School Board was not required to delineate with absolute clarity the distinction be-
tween activities imposing political messages and those imposing non-political messages. 
Id. at 437. The line drawn need only be reasonable and not a Cacade Cor viewpoint dis-
crimination. Id. Thus, an activity which may have an implicit political message, may be 
deemed non-political when 8uch message is 8ubsidiary to other aspects oC the activity_ld. 
184.ld. 
185. San Diego CARD, 790 F.2d at 1485. 
186.ld. 
187. 1d. 
188.ld. 
22
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 17, Iss. 1 [1987], Art. 6
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol17/iss1/6
1987] CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 45 
V. CRITIQUE 
A LIMITED PUBLIC FORUM 
The Ninth Circuit correctly followed precedent in holding 
that the School Board violated CARD's first amendment rights. 
The court properly concluded both that the school newspapers 
were limited public forums, and based on this, that the Board 
violated CARD's constitutional rights by refusing it access to the 
forum. By focusing on access to the school newspapers in gen-
eral, rather than to the advertising spaces in particular, the ma-
jority ignored the dicta of Cornelius v. NAACpI .. that the 
courts must "take a more tailored approach to ascertaining the 
perimeters of a forum within the confines of the government 
property."l~ Nevertheless, the majority correctly applied the 
Cornelius intent test and properly held that the school newspa-
pers were a limited public forum. 
The first prong of the Cornelius intent test involves an anal-
ysis of the government's policy and practice towards the forum 
at issue,,·l Here the Board's admitted policy was to allow the 
general public access to publish advertisements provided they 
offered goods, services, or vocational opportunities to the stu-
dents. In However, since the Board allowed, on a number of oc-
"casions, mixed commercial and political advertisements pertain-
ing to military service to be published in the newspapers, ItS its 
actual policy evinced an intent to open the forum for such 
speech. It must be noted that the court in San Diego CARD ex-
plicitly narrowed its holding to mixed commercial and political 
advertisements dealing only with military services. I ... 
Perry Education Association v. Perry Local Educators' As-
sociation1e& can be distinguished from San Diego CARD. In 
Perry, the Court determined that a school mail system was a 
non-public forum for the School Board's policy and practice did 
189. 105 S.Ct. 3439 (1985). 
190. [d. at 3449. 
191. See supra notes 56-58 and accompanying text. 
192. San Diego CARD, 790 F.2d at 1476. 
193. [d. at 1478. 
194. [d. 
195. 460 U.S. 37 (1983). 
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not render the mail system open to the general public.l98 Rather, 
the school had restricted its use to official business with very few 
exceptions.a7 Consequently, use of the system by an organiza-
tion affiliated with the school, such as the teachers' exclusive 
bargaining union, did not convert the mail system into a limited 
public forum. lea In San Diego CARD, however, the Board's ad-
mitted policy was to allow outside entities regular access to the 
newspaper advertising spaces.l~ 
San Diego CARD can also be distinguished from the non-
public forum found in Cornelius. In Cornelius, the government 
had developed extensive admission criteria and had consistently 
limited participation of groups soliciting funds in a charity drive 
conducted at a federal workplace.'oo In addition, the Court 
found that the federal workplace was not consistent with expres-
sive activity.lol In San Diego CARD, the S :hool Board had not 
developed an extensive or objective system for limiting the num-
ber of advertisements to be published.lol Furthermore, a school 
newspaper is a conduit for the dissemination of ideas20ll and 
serves as a communication channel for "wide exposure to [the] 
robust exchange of ideas."204 Thus, student newspapers are an 
important aspect of the educational process and are intimately 
compatible with expressive activity. 
The dissent in San Diego CARD lost sight of Cornelius 
when applying the second prong of the intent test. Judge W al-
lace did not focus on the nature of the school newspapers in 
which the advertisements were contained, as Cornelius re-
quires.2OII Rather, Judge Wallace focused on the nature of the 
196. Id. at 47. 
197.ld. 
198. Id. at 46·48. 
199. San Diego CARD, 790 F.2d at 1476. 
200. Cornelius v. NAACP, 105 S.Ct 3439, 3451 (1985). 
201. Id. 
202. San Diego CARD, 790 F.2d at 1480. 
203. See Gambino v. Faitfax City School Bd., 429 F. Supp. 731 (E.D. Va 1977) (high 
sehool newspaper a public forum publication of article concerning birth control could not 
be suppressed solely because the School Board did not deem it appropriate course con-
tent), aff'd, 564 F.2d 157 (4th Cir. 1977). See also Zucker v. Panitz, 299 F. Supp. 102 
(1969) (high sehool students were entitled to place advertisements in opposition to Viet-
nam war in the school newspaper). 
204. Tinker v. Des Moines School DisL, 393 U.S. 503, 512 (1969). 
205. See supra notes 56·60 and accompanying texL 
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advertising spaces specifically, thereby limiting his analysis on 
the compatibility issue. 
The dissent erroneously stated that the majority purported 
to introduce a test in direct conflict with the Cornelius intent 
test.2M In summarizing the majority's conclusion that the school 
newspapers constituted a limited public forum, Judge Wallace 
stated U[t]he majority's ... conclusion rests on its mistaken be· 
lief that if speech admitted in a forum relates to a 'controversial 
and political' issue, the government has created a limited public 
forum that encompasses the issue.''207 However, the majority did 
not rest its conclusion on such a test. As explained, the court 
properly applied the two prong test of Cornelius. SOl In keeping 
with the analysis in Perry,2OS when the government has cre:lted a 
limited public forum open to the general public for a discussion 
of certain topics, the constitutional right of access encompasses 
only those topics of similar character.21o Military service, the 
topic of "CARD's advertisement, clearly fell within the perime· 
ters of the limited public forum since military service advertise· 
ments had previously been published. 
Having found a limited public forum encompassing political 
military advertisements, the court correctly held that the Board 
violated CARD's first amendment rights when it denied CARD 
access, since the Board failed to advance a compelling govern· 
ment interest for its actions.211 
B. NON-PUBLIC FORUMS 
Even if the student newspapers were non-public forums, the 
court correctly held that the Board's restrictions on access were 
unreasonable and constituted viewpoint-based discrimination.s12 
The Perry Court explained that regulations must be assessed in 
light of the purpose of the forum and all the surrounding cir-
cumstances in order to preserve the forum for its intended pur-
206. San Diego CARD, 790 F.2d at 1484. 
207.Id. 
208. See supra text accompanying notes 121-129. 
209. 460 U.s. 37 (1983). 
210. Id. at 48. 
211. San Diego CARD, 790 F.2d at" 1478. See supra text accompanying notes t~-66. 
212. San Diego CARD, 790 F.2d at 1478. 
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pose.213 Applying the test set out in Tinker v. Des Moines 
School District,2J.· the School Board did not produce any evi-
dence to prove that granting publication of CARD's advertise-
ments would materially disrupt classwork or involve substantial 
disorder or invade the rights of others.216 In addition, since the 
purpose of the advertising spaces was to offer goods, services. or 
educational opportunities to the students, CARD's advertise-
ments would not have interfered with the purpose of the news-
papers Co2 communicative channels. 
Purporting to rely on Cornelius, the dissent maintained that 
CARD's advertisements could reasonably be excluded to avoid 
disruption in the schools.:ns In Cornelius, the Court stated that 
"[g]overnment need not wait until havoc is wreaked to restrict 
access in a non-public forum.un7 However, broad assertions of 
possible disruptions must be substantiated with evidence, 
though that evidence need not be conclusive.218 The Court in 
Cornelius found that enough evidence was presented to show 
that the continued participation of the advocacy groups in the 
charity drive would be detrimental to the Campaign and disrup-
tive of the federal workplace.21\) However, in San Diego CARD, 
no evidence was offered to substantiate the claim that CARD's 
advertisement would cause disruption in the schools.220 
San Diego CARD can also can be distinguished from the 
other key case relied upon by the dissent, Student Coalition for 
Peace v. Lower Merion School District.2S1 In that case, the 
Board sought to deny a political student group access to the 
school's athletic field in order to maintain the appearance of 
neutrality.222 The court in Student Coalition reasoned that since 
the Board had not allowed any other political groups access, the 
Board could then reasonably exclude the politically oriented 
213. Perry 460 U.S. at 46. See supra notes 79-83 and accompanying text. 
214. 393 U.S. 503 (1969). 
215. San Diego CARD, 790 F.2d. at 1480 n.10. 
216. Id. at 1485. 
217. 105 S.Ct. at 3453. 
218. Id. at 3453·54. 
219. Id. Evidence presented included letters from employees, managers and memo 
bers of Congress expressing concern over admittance of the organizations, over one thou· 
sand telephone complaints. and a decline in the number of contributions. Id. 
220. San Diego CARD, 7pl1 F.2d at 1480 n.l0. 
221. 776 F.2d 431 (3d Cir. 1985). 
222. Id. at 437. 
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Peace Fair.223 In San Diego CARD, the School Board did not 
exclude all politically controversial advertisements from publica-
tion. Therefore, since one side of the politically controversial 
question of military service was espoused, neutrality was lost. 
There could then be no justification for the exclusion of CARD's 
viewpoint.224 
VI. CONCLUSION 
In San Diego CARD, the Ninth Circuit found that an anti-
draft organization's first amendment rights were violated when 
it was denied access to publish advertisements in several high 
school newspapers. The conflict presented by the majority and 
dissenting opinions reflects the long standing battle between 
those holding a liberal view of first amendment freedoms and 
those adhering to a more restrictive approach. The majority's 
liberal approach, upholding the right of free speech, is essential 
in the school context, for it is in the schools where our nation's 
young are first introduced to our democratic system. Students 
must be allowed the freedom to assimilate unpopular and con-
troversial views to fully develop their own political beliefs and 
values. An understanding of this principal seems to underlie the 
majority opinion in San Diego CARD. 
Maureen Mullane· 
223.Id. 
224. See also Greer v. Spock. 424 U.s. 828 (1976). In Greer, the Court found a regu-
lation banning political speeches and demonstrations on a military base to be reasonable 
and not view-point-based discrimination. Id.at 838-40. The purpose of the base was to 
train soldiers, and like the school policy in Student Coalition, Fort Dix's policy did not 
allow for any partisan political campaigns on the base. [d. at 839. Therefore, it could not 
be said that the base was discriminating against one particular viewpoint since no politi-
cal viewpoints were granted access. Ill. at 838-839. (emphasis added). 
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